Apple Overstock Text Message

Scammers are now text messaging consumers regarding 1K giveaway in Apple Overstscamalertock Winnings

  • 216-282-5676
  • 770-809-3254
  • 602-329-7686
  • 631-428-6600

appleoverstock text messages =SPAM

appleoverstock

appleoverstockcc

The following A records are set to 141.101.124.218:

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ING AccessDirect, LLC ~ ingaccessdirect.com

The Purpose of this post is to ALERT you that the job you are about to apply for or may have applied FOR or is CONSIDERING APPLYING FOR is FRAUDULENT.

These job postings are an attempt to lure you into cashing counterfeit checks and have you wire funds via Western Union or MoneyGram. Essentially You Become A Money or RePackage Mule.

The identity of an individual or entity have been stolen along with fund from their bank accounts. You are being recruited to wire transfer these funds either by WESTERN UNION, MONEYGRAM, into your bank, a DOMESTIC BANK or FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNT

  1. Understanding The Cyber Theft Ring
  2. Money Mule Explained
  3. Protecting Yourself Against Money Mule
  4. Washingtonpost.com by Brian Kerbs
  5. Interview With A Money Mule
  6. Bobbear.co.UK ~ Historical Money Mule Sites
  7. Up-To-Date Money Mule Scam @ ScamWarners.com

Ingaccessdirect

CHECKS PROCESSING MANAGER

Financial Manager
Location: worldwide
Is it available at the present moment: Yes
Employee Type: Part-Time employee

Job description:

You will receive funds on your bank account that come from the stockbrokers and sale of the merchandise by our international clients. We will supply you with a detailed information about a transfer including full name of the sender and sum total in every given case.

When funds come to your bank account you have to transfer the funds to our client using international western union payment system. The main advantage of such service is the shortest time in which the seller can receive funds for the sold merchandise. If you delay this process, our client will be able to cancel the contract and we will suffer financial losses. Please remember that you are handling money, be very responsible and attentive!

Your compensation will be also deducted from the received funds on the commission basis. During the probationary period (30 days) you will be paid 1500 USD per month, plus 8% commission (11% for agents with corporate/business bank account) from every payment received from a client. After the completion of the probationary period your salary will go up to 2000 USD per month, plus 8% commission (11% for agents with corporate/business bank account) per successfully handled transfer.

You must to channel out received assets during two business days to our client as indicated in the contract.

Our clients value our performance and are ready to pay extra for shorter transaction terms. If we manage to deliver the merchandise top the buyer during 10 days, the deal considers to be fulfilled in rapid terms.

Probationary period also imposes restrictions on the social packet of our corporation. You will be able to receive ING AccessDirect, LLC. social packet only after you successfully complete the probationary period.

Social packet includes:
stock options, child-care subsidies, flex-time, business casual attire, educational assistance and professional development programs.

Detailed information concerning the social packet will be sent to you after the successful completion of the probationary period

Candidate requirements:

More than 18 years old.
An ability to reply promptly to the e-mails every day.
An ability to receive phone calls from us.
A bank account to receive payments
A good history with your bank
Absolutely no criminal offenses or convictions.
Experience in the financial sphere is welcome.

Financial Agent Job Instruction

This instruction describes the sequence of operations you have to follow upon receiving a bank payment from our customer.

Upon receipt of our payment order by TaskManager internal mail or e-mail, where payment sum and further transfer details are specified, you have to do the following.
Check the status of your bank account through on-line banking system or by phone.
As soon as the money is ready for withdrawal, you shall go to the nearest branch of your bank and withdraw the sum, indicated in the payment order, in cash.
Deduct your 8(11)% commission from this sum.
Afterwards go to the nearest Western Union MT Agency and make a transfer in accordance with the details, mentioned in the payment order. We strongly recommend to mention “assistance to friends” or “family expenses” in the “Transfer Purpose” field, as Western Union general rules forbid to support business transfers and therefore your transfer might be rejected or even frozen.
IMPORTANT: Western Union should be paid from your 8(11)% commission.
After the transfer is made, you have to go home and to fill out a TaskManager Form (see enclosed to the payment order).

Transfer processing is completed.

In case of any malfunctions contact ING AccessDirect, LLC. Senior Manager by e-mail or through TaskManager internal mail immediately and describe the problem in detail.

Fraudulent Attempts

Throughout our history fraudulent attempts from the part of Financial Agents to retain the transferred amounts were made only twice. Both cases were lodged to the court and resulted in considerable fines. Should you fail to contact us or cannot be contacted by phone within 12 hours upon receipt of the payment order, we have the right to send a message to your bank with a claim to freeze the transfer and to check your account cash flow. In case the transfer is already withdrawn, an inquiry will be sent to the law authorities of your country.

Looking forward to long-term and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Address lookup
canonical name ingaccessdirect.com
aliases
addresses 216.239.142.191
Domain Whois record

Queried whois.internic.net with “dom ingaccessdirect.com”…

Domain Name: INGACCESSDIRECT.COM
Registrar: OMNIS NETWORK, LLC
Whois Server: whois.omnis.com
Referral URL: http://domains.omnis.com
Name Server: NS1.OMNIS.COM
Name Server: NS2.OMNIS.COM
Name Server: NS3.OMNIS.COM
Status: ok
Updated Date: 26-sep-2012
Creation Date: 26-sep-2012
Expiration Date: 26-sep-2013

Last update of whois database: Wed, 26 Dec 2012 17:03:26 UTC
Queried whois.omnis.com with “ingaccessdirect.com

Whois Output for: ingaccessdirect.com

Registrant:
INAccess
7 Morton Terrace
Boston, Lincolnshire PE21 8GB
GB

Administrative Contact:
Kolojanskas, Audrius
INAccess
7 Morton Terrace
Boston, Lincolnshire PE21 8GB, GB
Phone: +44.205820983
Email: may.sheppard@hotmail.co.uk

Technical Contact:
Kolojanskas, Audrius
INAccess
7 Morton Terrace
Boston, Lincolnshire PE21 8GB, GB
Phone: +44.205820983
Email: may.sheppard@hotmail.co.uk

Billing Contact:
Kolojanskas, Audrius
INAccess
7 Morton Terrace
Boston, Lincolnshire PE21 8GB, GB
Phone: +44.205820983
Email: may.sheppard@hotmail.co.uk

Record Information:
Domain Record Created: September 25, 2012
Domain Record Updated: September 25, 2012
Domain Record Expires: September 25, 2013

DNS Information:
Name Server: ns1.omnis.com
Name Server: ns2.omnis.com
Name Server: ns3.omnis.com

Network Whois record

Queried rwhois.omnis.com with “216.239.142.191
rwhois V-1.0,V-1.5:000090h:00 rwhois.omnis.com (Omnis RWhois Server V-1.0.0)
network:Class-Name:network
network:ID:NET-11-216.239.136.0/21
network:Auth-Area:216.239.128.0/20
network:Network-Name:Web Hosting Customers
network:IP-Network:216.239.136.0/21
network:Organization:Omnis Network
network:Street-Address:3655 Torrance Blvd Suite 230
network:City:Torrance
network:State:CA
network:Postal-Code:90503
network:Country-Code:US
network:Tech-Email;I:support@omnis.com
network:Admin-Email;I:support@omnis.com
network:Abuse-Email;I:abuse@omnis.com
network:Created:20120112221410
network:Updated:201101010000
network:Updated-By:support@omnis.com
%ok

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 216.239.142.191″…

NetRange: 216.239.128.0 – 216.239.143.255
CIDR: 216.239.128.0/20
OriginAS:
NetName: OMNIS-NET-1
NetHandle: NET-216-239-128-0-1
Parent: NET-216-0-0-0-0
NetType: Direct Allocation
RegDate: 2000-11-29
Updated: 2012-03-02
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-216-239-128-0-1

OrgName: Omnis Network, LLC
OrgId: OMSN
Address: 3655 Torrance Blvd.
Address: Suite 230
City: Torrance
StateProv: CA
PostalCode: 90503
Country: US
RegDate: 2000-07-07
Updated: 2008-10-04
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/OMSN

ReferralServer: rwhois://rwhois.omnis.com:4321

OrgTechHandle: JF621-ARIN
OrgTechName: Fromm, James
OrgTechPhone: +1-310-316-1425
OrgTechEmail: fromm@omnis.com
OrgTechRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/JF621-ARIN

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE2022-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Abuse Department
OrgAbusePhone: +1-310-316-9600
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@omnis.com
OrgAbuseRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE2022-ARIN

RTechHandle: JF621-ARIN
RTechName: Fromm, James
RTechPhone: +1-310-316-1425
RTechEmail: fromm@omnis.com
RTechRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/JF621-ARIN

DNS records

DNS query for 191.142.239.216.in-addr.arpa returned an error from the server: NameError
name class type data time to live
ingaccessdirect.com IN SPF v=spf1 include:spf.guardedhost.com ~all 86400s (1.00:00:00)
ingaccessdirect.com IN SOA
server: primary.guardeddns.net
email: dns-admin@guardeddns.net
serial: 101
refresh: 28800
retry: 450
expire: 1209600
minimum ttl: 900
86400s (1.00:00:00)
ingaccessdirect.com IN NS ns2.omnis.com 172800s (2.00:00:00)
ingaccessdirect.com IN TXT v=spf1 include:spf.guardedhost.com ~all 86400s (1.00:00:00)
ingaccessdirect.com IN A 216.239.142.191 86400s (1.00:00:00)
ingaccessdirect.com IN NS ns3.omnis.com 172800s (2.00:00:00)
ingaccessdirect.com IN NS ns1.omnis.com 172800s (2.00:00:00)
ingaccessdirect.com IN MX
preference: 10
exchange: postoffice.omnis.com
86400s (1.00:00:00)

— end —

SEC Charges TheStreet, Inc. and Former Executives In Connection With Accounting Fraud

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Litigation Release No. 22575 / December 18, 2012
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3432 / December 18, 2012
Securities and Exchange Commission v. TheStreet, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-CV-9187 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. December 18, 2012)
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Eric Ashman, Civil Action No. 12-CV-9189 (S.D.N.Y. December 18, 2012); and
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Gregg Alwine and David Barnett, Civil Action No. 12-CV-9191 (S.D.N.Y. December 18, 2012)

SEC Charges TheStreet, Inc. and Former Executives In Connection With Accounting Fraud

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged TheStreet, Inc. and three executives in connection with a 2008 accounting fraud at a former subsidiary of TheStreet, Inc. The fraud allowed TheStreet to report artificially inflated revenue and misstated operating income or loss in each period of 2008.

The SEC alleges that throughout 2008, Eric Ashman, TheStreet’s former Chief Financial Officer, aided and abetted the fraud by improperly and prematurely recognizing revenue based on several of the former subsidiary’s transactions. According to the complaint, Ashman caused TheStreet to recognize revenue when he knew or recklessly disregarded that there was no basis for revenue recognition.

Gregg Alwine and David Barnett, co-presidents of the subsidiary, are alleged to have aided and abetted the fraud by entering into sham transactions, and fabricating and backdating contracts and other documents. In addition, Barnett is charged with leading TheStreet’s auditor to believe that the subsidiary had performed services and thereby earned revenue on a specific transaction when in fact it had not performed those services.

For its part, TheStreet is charged with lacking appropriate internal controls over its subsidiary’s revenue and with violating books and records and reporting provisions of the securities laws.

The Commission alleges that (1) Ashman violated Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rules 13a-14 and 13b2-1 thereunder and aided and abetted violations by TheStreet.com of Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5(b), 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder; and failed to comply with Section 304(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; (2) Alwine and Barnett violated Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13b2-1 thereunder and aided and abetted TSC’s violations of Section 10(b)(5), 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5(b), 12b-20 and 13a-13 thereunder; and Barnett violated Rule 13b2-2; and (3) TheStreet violated Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder.

Without admitting or denying the Commission’s allegations, each of the defendants has agreed to be permanently enjoined from future violations of the federal securities laws. In addition, Ashman will pay a $125,000 penalty, reimburse TheStreet $34,240.40 pursuant to Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and will be barred from acting as a director or officer of a public company for a period of three years. Alwine and Barnett will pay penalties of $120,000 and $130,000, respectively, and will be barred from serving as officers or directors of a public company for ten years.

# # #

http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22575.htm

Vestrium LTD ~ vestriumltd.com

The Purpose of this post is to ALERT you that the job you are about to apply for or may have applied FOR or is CONSIDERING APPLYING FOR is FRAUDULENT.

These job postings are an attempt to lure you into cashing counterfeit checks and have you wire funds via Western Union or MoneyGram. Essentially You Become A Money or RePackage Mule.

The identity of an individual or entity have been stolen along with fund from their bank accounts. You are being recruited to wire transfer these funds either by WESTERN UNION, MONEYGRAM, into your bank, a DOMESTIC BANK or FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNT

  1. Understanding The Cyber Theft Ring
  2. Money Mule Explained
  3. Protecting Yourself Against Money Mule
  4. Washingtonpost.com by Brian Kerbs
  5. Interview With A Money Mule
  6. Bobbear.co.UK ~ Historical Money Mule Sites

Dear scamFRAUDalert,

Based on the recent phone interview conducted and your CV we believe that you are the right candidate to join our team and I am glad to inform you that one post of Administrative Assistant is offered to you.

The final step of your application, work process description and job contract can be found at:

http://www.vestriumltd.com/admincontract.html

Should you have any questions do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,
Pauline Costello,
Vestrium LTD

Address lookup
canonical name vestriumltd.com.
aliases
addresses 98.139.135.22
98.139.135.21
Domain Whois record

Queried whois.internic.net with “dom vestriumltd.com”…

Domain Name: VESTRIUMLTD.COM
Registrar: MELBOURNE IT, LTD. D/B/A INTERNET NAMES WORLDWIDE
Whois Server: whois.melbourneit.com
Referral URL: http://www.melbourneit.com
Name Server: YNS1.YAHOO.COM
Name Server: YNS2.YAHOO.COM
Status: clientTransferProhibited
Updated Date: 09-aug-2012
Creation Date: 09-aug-2012
Expiration Date: 09-aug-2013

Last update of whois database: Wed, 26 Dec 2012 16:31:36 UTC
Queried whois.melbourneit.com with “vestriumltd.com

Domain Name………. vestriumltd.com
Creation Date…….. 2012-08-09
Registration Date…. 2012-08-09
Expiry Date………. 2013-08-09
Tracking Number…… 1737980076_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Organisation Name…. Pauline Costello
Organisation Address. PO Box 61359
Organisation Address. Sunnyvale
Organisation Address. 94088
Organisation Address. CA
Organisation Address. US

Admin Name……….. Admin PrivateRegContact
Admin Address…….. PO Box 61359
Admin Address…….. registered post accepted only
Admin Address. Sunnyvale
Admin Address…….. 94088
Admin Address…….. CA
Admin Address…….. US
Admin Email………. contact@myprivateregistration.com
Admin Phone………. +1.510-595-2002

Tech Name………… TECH PrivateRegContact
Tech Address……… PO Box 61359
Tech Address……… registered post accepted only
Tech Address……… Sunnyvale
Tech Address……… 94088
Tech Address……… CA
Tech Address……… US
Tech Email……….. contact@myprivateregistration.com
Tech Phone……….. +1.510-595-2002
Name Server………. yns1.yahoo.com
Name Server………. yns2.yahoo.com

Network Whois record

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 98.139.135.22″…

NetRange: 98.136.0.0 – 98.139.255.255
CIDR: 98.136.0.0/14
OriginAS:
NetName: A-YAHOO-US9
NetHandle: NET-98-136-0-0-1
Parent: NET-98-0-0-0-0
NetType: Direct Allocation
RegDate: 2007-12-07
Updated: 2012-03-02
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-98-136-0-0-1

OrgName: Yahoo! Inc.
OrgId: YHOO
Address: 701 First Ave
City: Sunnyvale
StateProv: CA
PostalCode: 94089
Country: US
RegDate: 2000-10-23
Updated: 2009-05-18
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/YHOO

OrgTechHandle: NA258-ARIN
OrgTechName: Netblock Admin
OrgTechPhone: +1-408-349-3300
OrgTechEmail: jluster@yahoo-inc.com
OrgTechRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NA258-ARIN

OrgAbuseHandle: NETWO857-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Network Abuse
OrgAbusePhone: +1-408-349-3300
OrgAbuseEmail: network-abuse@cc.yahoo-inc.com
OrgAbuseRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NETWO857-ARIN

RAbuseHandle: NETWO857-ARIN
RAbuseName: Network Abuse
RAbusePhone: +1-408-349-3300
RAbuseEmail: network-abuse@cc.yahoo-inc.com
RAbuseRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NETWO857-ARIN

RTechHandle: NA258-ARIN
RTechName: Netblock Admin
RTechPhone: +1-408-349-3300
RTechEmail: jluster@yahoo-inc.com
RTechRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NA258-ARIN

DNS records
name class type data time to live
vestriumltd.com IN TXT i=319&m=geo-g7-mx2-p9 1200s (00:20:00)
vestriumltd.com IN A 98.139.135.22 1200s (00:20:00)
vestriumltd.com IN A 98.139.135.21 1200s (00:20:00)
vestriumltd.com IN MX
preference: 30
exchange: mx5.biz.mail.yahoo.com
1200s (00:20:00)
vestriumltd.com IN MX
preference: 20
exchange: mx1.biz.mail.yahoo.com
1200s (00:20:00)
vestriumltd.com IN NS yns2.yahoo.com 86400s (1.00:00:00)
vestriumltd.com IN NS yns1.yahoo.com 86400s (1.00:00:00)
vestriumltd.com IN SOA
server: hidden-master.yahoo.com
email: geo-support@yahoo-inc.com
serial: 2012111601
refresh: 10800
retry: 3600
expire: 7084000
minimum ttl: 28800
1200s (00:20:00)
22.135.139.98.in-addr.arpa IN PTR sbsfe-b.geo.vip.bf1.yahoo.com 1800s (00:30:00)
135.139.98.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns4.yahoo.com 172800s (2.00:00:00)
135.139.98.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns5.yahoo.com 172800s (2.00:00:00)
135.139.98.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns3.yahoo.com 172800s (2.00:00:00)
135.139.98.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns2.yahoo.com 172800s (2.00:00:00)
135.139.98.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns1.yahoo.com 172800s (2.00:00:00)
135.139.98.in-addr.arpa IN TXT Contact for this domain is Yahoo! NOC, +1 408 349 5555 1800s (00:30:00)
135.139.98.in-addr.arpa IN SOA
server: hidden-master.yahoo.com
email: hostmaster@yahoo-inc.com
serial: 2012121201
refresh: 3600
retry: 600
expire: 5184000
minimum ttl: 1800
600s (00:10:00)

— end —

Organizer of International Securities Fraud

Organizer of international Securities Fraud Ring Perpetrated Through Botnets and Stock Manipulation Convicted

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 30, 2012

TRENTON, N.J. – A federal jury today convicted a central organizer of aSEC conspiracy to commit securities fraud which was perpetrated through the use of botnets located throughout the world, U.S. Attorney Paul J. Fishman announced.

The jury returned the guilty verdicts against Christopher Rad, 44, of Cedar Park, Texas, following a 9-day trial before U.S. District Judge Joel A. Pisano in Trenton Federal Court. Rad was convicted of six counts, including: (1) Conspiracy of furthering securities fraud by transmitting spam using false e-mail headers and transmitting spam using falsely registered e-mail addresses; (2) Conspiracy to transmit spam by gaining unauthorized access to computers and using those computers to transmit spam; and (3) four counts of transmission of spam by gaining unauthorized access to computers and using those computers to transmit spam.

Rad’s co-conspirators, Doyle Scott Elliott and James Bragg, previously pleaded guilty on July 24, 2012, and Oct. 20, 2010, respectively, to securities fraud and transmission of spam through falsely registered e-mail addresses. Elliott will be sentenced on May 2, 2013. Bragg is awaiting a sentencing date.

According to documents filed in this case and evidence at trial:

Stock promoters in a scheme to manipulate the price and volume of approximately 39 stocks, including, RSUV, QRVS, VSHE, SVXA, and ASIC (the “Manipulated Stocks”), engaged Rad in order to generate a market for the stocks so that they could dump them for a profit – a practice known as a “pump and dump” scheme. The scheme began as early as May 2007 and continued through February 2009. After conspiring with the stock promoters, Rad sought out and engaged “mailers,” which the evidence demonstrated were actually “spammers.” He then sent the spammers the precise language to include in their spam campaigns.

The spammers included two individuals who distributed spam through botnets. To create a botnet, viruses were sent out to infect computers around the world and create a virtual army of hijacked computers. The spammers then caused the botnets to distribute spam to promote the Manipulated Stocks. Infected computers included some found in New Jersey, Europe, Russia and elsewhere. The botnet, in turn, was controlled from command and control servers located overseas, including in Russia and China.

Rad, who went by the alias “billy_sack,” communicated with the spammers by Skype, in most instances knowing them only by their aliases, such as “breg,” “ega,” “billybob6001,” “be3ez12.”

Rad paid the spammers over $1.4 million during the twenty-two months of the conspiracy. These payments were made through e-Gold and money wires. Payments intended for a botnet operator in Russia were made through at least eight different countries. The wire instruction notations included false information such as payments for “Dell Monitors,” “touch panels” and “transportation services.”

Rad also agreed with others to engage in bad faith purchases of RSUV to create the impression that the stock was active. This was done during the course of the spam campaigns of RSUV so that recipients of the spam would perceive active trading in the stock.

Doyle Scott Elliott, a stock promoter who was also part of the conspiracy, falsified documents submitted to attorneys in order to obtain opinion letters to secure millions of freely traded shares in those stocks. Those letters certified that trading restrictions on shares of the Manipulated Stocks could be lifted because certain conditions set forth in securities regulations were met.

Finally, Rad and his co-conspirators put disclaimers in their mailings, but misrepresented the amount of stock that would be dumped into the market. In one instance, Rad and his co-conspirators held more than 70% of the outstanding shares in a stock yet disclosed only that they held about 20%.

The investigation revealed that at the same time that Rad was engaging spammers to facilitate his pump and dump scheme, hackers hacked into the brokerage accounts of third parties, liquidated the stocks in those accounts, and then used those accounts to purchase shares of some of the Manipulated Stocks. This created trading activity in the Manipulated Stocks and increased the volume of shares being traded, further creating an impression that the Manipulated Stocks were worth purchasing.

Each count of conviction carries a maximum potential penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense. Sentencing is currently scheduled for Apr. 4, 2013.

U.S. Attorney Fishman credited special agents of the FBI, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Michael B. Ward in Newark, with the investigation leading to today’s guilty verdicts. He also thanked the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement, led by Director Robert Khuzami.

The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew S. Pak of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Section and Erez Liebermann, Chief of the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Section.

This case was brought in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

12-414

Defense counsel: Francis Montenegro, Esq., Austin, Texas

http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/Rad,%20Christopher%20Verdict%20PR.html

Must Read – KerbsOnSecurity.com

SEC Charges Four Penny Stock Purchasers with Fraud

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2012-278

Washington, D.C., Dec. 21, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission SECtoday charged four securities industry professionals with conducting a fraudulent penny stock scheme in which they illegally acquired more than one billion unregistered shares in microcap companies at deep discounts and then dumped them on the market for approximately $17 million in illicit profits while claiming bogus exemptions from the federal securities laws.


Additional Materials


The SEC alleges that Danny Garber, Michael Manis, Kenneth Yellin, and Jordan Feinstein acquired shares at about 30 to 60 percent off the market price by misrepresenting to the penny stock companies that they intended to hold the shares for investment purposes rather than immediately re-selling them. Instead, they immediately sold the shares without registering them by purporting to rely on an exemption for transactions that are in compliance with certain types of state law exemptions. However, no such state law exemptions were applicable to their transactions. To create the appearance that the claimed exemption was valid, they created virtual corporate presences in Minnesota, Texas, and Delaware. The SEC also charged 12 entities that they operated in connection with the scheme.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Manhattan, Garber, Manis, Yellin, and Feinstein all live in the New York/New Jersey area and operated the scheme from 2007 to 2010. They each have previously worked in the securities industry either as registered representatives or providers of investment management or financial advisory services.

“These penny stock purchasers had enough securities industry experience to know that their penny stock trading was not exempt from the securities laws as they claimed,” said Andrew M. Calamari, Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office. “They repeatedly violated the registration provisions and in the process also committed securities fraud. We will continue to fight microcap stock abuses that result in the unregistered distribution of shares without vital information about those companies being known to investors.”

The SEC’s complaint alleges that Garber, Manis, Yellin, Feinstein and the named entities violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The SEC’s complaint seeks a final judgment, among other things, ordering all of the defendants to pay disgorgement, prejudgment interest and financial penalties; permanently enjoining all the defendants from future violations of the securities laws; and permanently enjoining all the defendants from participating in penny stock offerings.

The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Michael Paley, Laura Yeu, Elzbieta Wraga, Haimavathi Marlier, Yitzchok Klug and Paul Gizzi of the New York Regional Office. Mr. Gizzi and Ms. Marlier will lead the SEC’s litigation.

Muhammad Rizwan aka Samreen Rizwan~ www.eweb.pk


Warning
Muhammad Rizwan Aka Samreen Rizwan eweb.pk

I have been scammed by Muhammad Rizwan aka Samreen rizwan http://www.eweb.pk

This guy is using different tricks to scam people…..everyone

1. He has a fake website (eweb.pk) once you expose your credit card number, All your money will be gone. When you go to bank, then they will say that’s your responsibility whom to expose your credit cards. Sorry we cannot do anything.

2. This guy will insist you to pay for domain registration and web design and web development. Once you pay the money, the money is gone and you will never get your work done.

3. This guy disappear and he never ever replies to your email or phone calls
He does not care or show sympathy about you. His purpose only to take your money that’s it.

These kinds of people living on fraud, scamming money.

Muhammad Rizwan has joint team of scammers and frauds Team

Their Names are follows:

  1. Muhammad Rizwan aka Samreen Rizwan
  2. Muhammad Nisar Mughal
  3. Muhammad Usman
  4. Hassn butt

Search on Google about these scammers using different names website and companies.

http://eweb.pk

Address lookup
canonical name eweb.pk

aliases
addresses 174.121.135.190
Domain Whois record

Queried with “eweb.pk”…

Query error: NoWhoisServerForDomain
Network Whois record

Queried rwhois.theplanet.com with “174.121.135.190”…

%rwhois V-1.5:003fff:00 rwhois.softlayer.com (by Network Solutions, Inc. V-1.5.9.5)
network:Class-Name:network
network:ID:NETBLK-THEPLANET-BLK-16
network:Auth-Area:174.120.0.0/14
network:Network-Name:TPIS-BLK-174-121-135-0
network:IP-Network:174.121.135.160/27
network:IP-Network-Block:174.121.135.160 – 174.121.135.191
network:Organization;I:WebsiteWelcome
network:Street-Address:N/A
network:City:Boca Raton
network:State:FL
network:Postal-Code:33496
network:Country-Code:USA
network:Tech-Contact;I:abuse@websitewelcome.com
network:Admin-Contact;I:abuse@websitewelcome.com
network:Created:20100325
network:Updated:20100325

%ok

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 174.121.135.190″…

NetRange: 174.120.0.0 – 174.123.255.255
CIDR: 174.120.0.0/14
OriginAS: AS36420, AS30315, AS13749, AS21844
NetName: NETBLK-THEPLANET-BLK-16
NetHandle: NET-174-120-0-0-1
Parent: NET-174-0-0-0-0
NetType: Direct Allocation
RegDate: 2009-03-23
Updated: 2012-02-24
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-174-120-0-0-1

OrgName: ThePlanet.com Internet Services, Inc.
OrgId: TPCM
Address: 315 Capitol
Address: Suite 205
City: Houston
StateProv: TX
PostalCode: 77002
Country: US
RegDate: 1999-08-31
Updated: 2010-10-13
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/TPCM

ReferralServer: rwhois://rwhois.theplanet.com:4321

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE271-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: The Planet Abuse
OrgAbusePhone: +1-281-714-3560
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@theplanet.com
OrgAbuseRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE271-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: THEPL-ARIN
OrgNOCName: The Planet NOC
OrgNOCPhone: +1-281-714-3555
OrgNOCEmail: noc@theplanet.com
OrgNOCRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/THEPL-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: TECHN33-ARIN
OrgTechName: Technical Support
OrgTechPhone: +1-214-782-7800
OrgTechEmail: admins@theplanet.com
OrgTechRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/TECHN33-ARIN

RNOCHandle: THEPL-ARIN
RNOCName: The Planet NOC
RNOCPhone: +1-281-714-3555
RNOCEmail: noc@theplanet.com
RNOCRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/THEPL-ARIN

RAbuseHandle: ABUSE271-ARIN
RAbuseName: The Planet Abuse
RAbusePhone: +1-281-714-3560
RAbuseEmail: abuse@theplanet.com
RAbuseRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE271-ARIN

RTechHandle: TECHN33-ARIN
RTechName: Technical Support
RTechPhone: +1-214-782-7800
RTechEmail: admins@theplanet.com
RTechRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/TECHN33-ARIN

DNS records
name class type data time to live
eweb.pk IN MX
preference: 10
exchange: aspmx.l.google.com
14400s (04:00:00)
eweb.pk IN MX
preference: 0
exchange: eweb.pk
14400s (04:00:00)
eweb.pk IN TXT v=spf1 ip4:184.173.239.120 a mx include:websitewelcome.com ~all 14400s (04:00:00)
eweb.pk IN SOA
server: ns1221.websitewelcome.com
email: dnsadmin@calibra.websitewelcome.com
serial: 2012042800
refresh: 86400
retry: 7200
expire: 3600000
minimum ttl: 86400
86400s (1.00:00:00)
eweb.pk IN NS ns1221.websitewelcome.com 86400s (1.00:00:00)
eweb.pk IN NS ns1222.websitewelcome.com 86400s (1.00:00:00)
eweb.pk IN A 174.121.135.190 14400s (04:00:00)
190.135.121.174.in-addr.arpa IN PTR be.87.79ae.static.theplanet.com 86400s (1.00:00:00)
135.121.174.in-addr.arpa IN SOA
server: ns3.arpa.networklayer.com
email: root@softlayer.com
serial: 2012010400
refresh: 7200
retry: 600
expire: 1728000
minimum ttl: 43200
86400s (1.00:00:00)
135.121.174.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns4.arpa.networklayer.com 86400s (1.00:00:00)
135.121.174.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns3.arpa.networklayer.com 86400s (1.00:00:00)

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